WHY SPIRIT IS THE NATURAL ALLY OF REASON: SPIRIT, REASON, AND THE FINE IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC

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1. Introduction

In the Republic Socrates claims that the soul has three distinct parts or elements, each an independent source of motivation: the reasoning part, the appetitive part, and the spirited part. Socrates’ characterization of the reasoning and appetitive parts is fairly clear and intuitive. The reasoning part desires to know the truth, including the truth about how to live, and motivates us to act in accordance with those discoveries. The appetitive part, by contrast, seeks gratification and motivates us to pursue the satisfaction of whatever desires we happen to have, irrespective of their relation to what is good overall.\(^1\) Socrates’ characterization of the spirited part, however, is notoriously obscure.

The spirited part, to thumocides, poses two interrelated problems for readers of the Republic. First, Socrates describes the spirited part as the source of so many different kinds of desires—including irrational anger (441 C 1–2), the emotional reaction to the perception that something is right or wrong (439 E 5–440 D 5), and the love of victory and honour (581 A 8–B 3)—that it is difficult to discern what, exactly, it aims for and pursues. Indeed, some scholars

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\(^1\) This is not to say that there are no puzzles about how we should understand the reasoning and appetitive parts. For an opinionated overview see my ‘The Tripartite Theory of Motivation in Plato’s Republic’ [‘Tripartite’], Blackwell Philosophy Compass, 5.11 (2010), 880–92.
have denied that it has any unity at all. Second, while it is easy to assign desires that are based on rational evaluation to the reasoning part of the soul and desires that are not based on the same sort of rational outlook to the appetitive part, it is not at all clear what we are to think of the desires of the spirited part, which Socrates alternatively describes as sensitive (440 b–e) and indifferent (441 b–c) to rational evaluation.

Recently, however, a consensus has emerged regarding how we should understand the spirited part. Numerous scholars have argued that the motivations of the spirited part revolve around the desire for self-worth, self-respect, or self-esteem. These commentators contend that individuals attain self-worth when they perceive that they are reaching an ideal, the ideal of being fine and honourable. In other words, spirit aims for the fine, to kalon. These commentators stress, however, that the individual’s conception of what it is to be fine and honourable is determined by social norms, though the subject ultimately internalizes these norms.

In this paper I argue against this prevalent interpretation and offer a new account of the motivations of the spirited part. I argue that while it is correct to hold that spirit aims to be fine and honourable, it is not the case that the agent’s conception of what it is to be fine and honourable is determined by social norms. Instead, there is a fact of the matter about what it is to be fine and honourable, and it is this fact that shapes the individual’s conception of the fine and honourable. I argue that being fine and honourable involves living up to your rational views about how you should be.

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2 F. M. Cornford, ‘Psychology and Social Structure in the Republic of Plato’, Classical Quarterly, 6 (1912), 246–65 at 262–5, argues that Plato fails to distinguish anger from the different motive of the sentiment of honour or self-respect. T. M. Robinson, Plato’s Psychology (Toronto, 1995), 44–6, argues that spirit covers a gamut of importantly different emotional states, from pure anger to noble courage, self-respect, and self-assertion.

3 W. F. R. Hardie, A Study in Plato (Oxford, 1936), 141–3, argues that spirit has two senses, one of which is indistinguishable from reason, and the other of which is indistinguishable from appetite. T. Penner, ‘Thought and Desire in Plato’, in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, ii (Garden City, NY, 1971), 96–118 at 111–12, endorses Hardie’s arguments and concludes that the spirited part does no real philosophical work in Plato’s moral psychology.

have, despite appetitive temptations to the contrary. I claim that this condition of the soul is the basis of a variety of interrelated admirable traits, some with moral and others with aesthetic connotations. Thus, spirit, with its aim of attaining self-worth through being fine and honourable, strives for this condition of the soul.

I begin in Section 2 by canvassing the various things that Socrates says about the spirited part of the soul; this will bring into sharp relief the problems in providing an account of spirit, and in particular, the tension between Socrates’ view of spirit as highly responsive to reason and an independent source of motivation. In Section 3 I consider the current dominant interpretation, and I argue that it fails to address important features of Socrates’ characterization of spirit. More specifically, it fails to explain Socrates’ repeated claim that spirit is the natural ally of reason, and the relationship between spirited desires and what is truly fine. I argue that the problem for the current dominant interpretation is its claim that the individual’s conception of the fine is determined by social norms. Accordingly, in Section 4 I turn to Socrates’ own account of the fine, with the primary aim of illuminating his conception of the fine and honourable person. In Section 5 I use this account to provide a new interpretation of the spirited part which explains both the unity underlying the various desires that Socrates attributes to spirit, and his claim that spirit is the natural ally of reason. In addition, I argue that my interpretation explains Socrates’ _prima facie_ puzzling claim that being ruled by the spirited part is second-best, and also provides a new way of understanding the overall structure of Socrates’ conception of early education. I hope as well that my interpretation of spirit highlights some interesting and neglected features of our moral psychology, which I briefly discuss in the conclusion.

2. The many motivations of the spirited part of the soul

Socrates’ most explicit characterizations of spirit occur in _Republic_ 4 (439e–442d), 8 (545b–550c), and 9 (580b–592b), where he describes the spirited part of the soul as the source of a wide variety of motivations, and in particular, as both sensitive and indifferent to rational calculation.

Socrates first explicitly introduces the spirited part of the soul as that with which we feel anger (439e 3–4). Since the appetitive
element can also be the source of strong feelings, he distinguishes spirit and appetite by showing that they can give rise to conflicting motivations in the same circumstances. He presents the case of Leontius, who feels a strong appetitive desire to look at corpses, but whose spirit is angry at and disgusted by his desire (439 E 3–440 A 8). He argues that the case of Leontius illustrates a fairly common psychological phenomenon whereby whenever the appetites force someone to act against his rational calculations, he becomes angry at those appetites and fights against them (440 A 9–B 4); and he goes on to claim that in general, whenever reason and the appetites conflict, spirit allies itself with reason (440 B 4–7).

Socrates proceeds to give more cases that emphasize the special relationship between reason and spirit. He argues that a noble man who believes he has done wrong refuses to let his spirit become roused when he is punished (440 C 1–7). The spirit of a man who believes himself wronged, on the other hand, boils with anger and fights for justice, despite all manner of physical discomforts, until it ‘achieves its purpose, or dies, or, like a dog being called to heel by a shepherd, is called back by the reason alongside it and becomes gentle’ (440 C 7–D 5). Glaucon agrees, and reminds them that the auxiliaries in the city (the class of citizens that corresponds to the spirited part of the soul) are like obedient sheepdogs for the city’s rulers (the class that corresponds to the rational part) (440 D 5–8).

Socrates concludes this entire discussion by reiterating the idea that whenever there is faction in the soul, spirit is far more likely to take arms on the side of reason (440 E 3–6); and he claims that spirit is the natural auxiliary of reason as long as it has not been corrupted by a bad upbringing (441 A 2–4). In addition to all of this, Socrates defines courage, the characteristic virtue of the spirited part, in terms of reason: he argues that courage consists in spirit’s ability to preserve the pronouncements of reason as to what should and should not inspire fear in the face of all sorts of pleasures and pains (442 B 9–C 3).

Sometimes, however, Socrates characterizes spirit in ways that appear to have nothing to do with reason. Thus, in Republic 4 he presents two arguments for thinking that spirit is distinct from reason. First, he claims that small children and animals have spirit, but not reason (441 A 5–B 2). And second, he claims that the motivations of spirit and reason can conflict. He illustrates this idea with

5 All translations are from C. D. C. Reeve, Plato: Republic (Indianapolis, 2004).
the case of Odysseus. Odysseus returns home from a long journey to find that numerous men are trying to marry his wife and acquire his kingdom; additionally, his maids are cavorting with these enemies in his own home. He becomes extremely angry and wants to retaliate immediately, but this conflicts with his rational belief that it is better overall to wait. Socrates says that Homer represents the part that reasons about the better and worse courses of action as different from the part that is irrationally angry (441 B 4–C 3).

In Republic 8 and 9 we find a very different characterization of spirit. In Republic 9 Socrates maintains that each part of the soul is wholly directed towards a certain goal, and he claims that when an individual is ruled by a certain part of the soul, he organizes his life around the pursuit of that goal (580 d–581 c). The spirited part, he argues, aims for mastery, victory, and high repute, and so it is appropriate to call it the victory-loving and honour-loving part (581 A 8–B 3). In Republic 8 he describes the individual who is ruled by the spirited part of the soul as a proud and honour-loving man (550 B 6–8). He argues that such an individual has a strong interest in ruling, physical training, hunting, and war, but is not skilled in speaking (548 B 3–549 A 8). This characterization of spirit as loving victory, honour, and esteem seems to have nothing to do with its allegiance to reason. In fact, Socrates’ emphasis on these things suggests that the spirited part is highly attuned not to reason but to the opinions of others.

What, if anything, unifies the diverse range of motivations that Socrates attributes to spirit? And what explains Socrates’ characterization of spirit as both the natural ally of reason and an independent source of motivation, one that can, at times, even conflict with reason?

3. The spirited part of the soul and socially constructed ideals

Many have noted that the motivations of the spirited part crucially involve the subject’s evaluation of himself and his own condition. Leontius, for example, is angry and ashamed at himself for his perverse desires. The emotions that Socrates describes as stemming from the perception of injustice are not based on an awareness of injustice in general, but rather on the perception that the subject himself has either done wrong or been wronged. Odysseus’ anger
seems to be related to the perception that he is being harmed. And finally, the desires for honour and victory are also desires to see oneself as in some sense good or triumphant, and they can give rise to pride when satisfied and shame when thwarted.

Accordingly, many commentators have argued that the ultimate aim of the spirited part is something like self-worth, self-respect, or self-esteem. Commentators argue further that self-worth is attained when we perceive that we are reaching an ideal. Since spirit aims for honour, it is reasonable to conclude that the relevant type or ideal is the fine, noble, or honourable person—the person worth admiring. Defenders of this interpretation stress, however, that individuals obtain their conception of what is fine and honourable from social conceptions of value, though the subject ultimately internalizes these norms and values.\(^6\)

I take this to be the upshot of the most prevalent interpretations of spirit. This is especially clear in the interpretations proposed by Gosling, Hobbs, and Kamtekar. Gosling, \textit{Plato}, argues that ‘Plato is interested in the fact that men are capable of accepting rules of conduct not on the basis of reason, nor yet from fear, but from some sense of what is honourable or manly—an acceptance based on admiration of a type’ (44); and ‘This [admiration for a type] gets instilled in childhood by the heroes of one’s reading’ (47). According to Hobbs, \textit{Plato and the Hero}, ‘the essence of the human thumos is the need to believe that one counts for something, and that central to this need will be a tendency to form an ideal image of oneself in accordance with one’s conception of the fine and noble’ (30); and ‘Society is also needed to provide the general content of one’s self-ideal through its values, and particularly through the embodiment of these values in its heroes’ (31). According to Kamtekar, ‘Imperfect Virtue’, the motivations of the spirited part revolve around judgements of worth; she says, ‘For the spirited part, what is at stake in approving or disapproving the appetitive part’s desires [for example] is a sense of the honorable or the noble which one ought to live up to. Because judgments of worth are dependent on social conceptions of value, they can be made to follow the judgments in terms of overall goodness which reason makes’ (326, my brackets). This characterization of the spirited part is also strongly suggested by the interpretations of Annas and Cooper. Annas, \textit{Introduction}, argues that the spirited part ‘involves some reference to the self, and some reference to ideals’ (128), and that ‘Spirit is thought of as educable and plastic; people can be trained to feel one way rather than another’ (ibid.). Cooper, ‘Human Motivation’, argues that ‘the motivations that Plato classifies under the heading of spirit are to be understood as having their root in competitiveness and the desire for self-esteem and (as a normal presupposition of this) esteem by others’ (14–15); and ‘the origins of one’s thumos-desires do not in any event lie in rational processes of reflection, but in all kinds of contingencies in one’s upbringing and subsequent life’ (16). Recently, M. Burnyeat, ‘The Truth of Tripartition’, \textit{Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society} 106 (2006), 1–22, and J. Wilberding, ‘Plato’s Two Forms of Second-Best Morality’ ['Second-Best Morality'], \textit{Philosophical Review}, 118 (2009), 351–74, have proposed a slightly different view. They both argue that spirit is essentially social and other-directed and that its aim is to win the respect of others; thus, they downplay the notion of internalization that others stress. The objections that I raise against the current dominant interpretation apply to their accounts as well.
Thus, on this view, Leontius is angry at his desires for moving him to act in a way that he and his society find dishonourable. The spirit of a noble man refuses to become aroused when he is punished for injustice because he has been educated to believe that an honourable man should withstand just punishment. Odysseus is angry with his maids because their behaviour makes him see himself as a man who is not deserving of honour and respect; thus, they make him see himself in a way that conflicts with the traditional conception of what it is to be a man and a ruler of one’s own home. The individual ruled by the spirited part desires victory, since his society honours such accomplishments. And finally, commentators typically argue that the anger and aggression of small children should be seen as a primitive manifestation of the central phenomenon, which is transformed into something different in mature humans.

Despite its many proponents, there are two serious objections to this account of spirit. First, this view does not readily explain Socrates’ claim that spirit has a privileged relationship to reason. Defenders of this interpretation try to explain this privileged relationship by arguing that spirit can be trained to conceive of the fine and noble in the same way that reason conceives of the good. Indeed, most commentators think that the educational programme described in books 2 and 3 of the Republic is primarily geared towards the spirited part of the soul. They argue that the aim of this programme is to ensure that the beliefs about what sorts of things are fine and honourable that we acquire through culture at a young age are consistent with the rational beliefs about the good that we might acquire later, once we have developed our reason. As evidence for this view, commentators note that Socrates seems interested in using education to develop traits such as courage, self-discipline, and a sense of shame, which are associated with spirit. Moreover, in Republic 4 Socrates claims that spirit can be corrupted by a bad upbringing (441 A 3–4); and he claims shortly there-

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after that a mixture of musical and physical training makes reason and spirit concordant (441 b 6–442 a 3).

But this interpretation leaves unexplained Socrates’ claim that spirit is ‘the natural ally of reason, unless it has been corrupted by a bad upbringing’ (ἐπίκουρον ὑπ’ τῷ λογιστικῷ φόσει, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῆ, 441 a 3–4). Socrates’ contention in this direction implies that spirit has an inherent tendency to align with reason, which a bad education can interfere with, but which a good education does not necessarily create.

Defenders of this interpretation might respond that when Socrates says that the spirited part is the natural ally of reason, he does not mean that spirit typically aligns with reason, but rather that it is right, correct, or healthy for spirit to ally itself with reason. In other words, they might respond that when Socrates says that spirit is the natural ally of reason he is not making a descriptive claim, but rather a normative claim.

But while the normative sense of ‘natural’ is surely part of what is meant in this context, it is clear that the descriptive sense is intended as well. First, Socrates seems to be speaking quite generally when he states that spirit consistently supports reason’s decisions. Following his discussion of Leontius, Socrates claims that on occasions when appetite forces someone to act against his reason, the person becomes angry and reproaches himself, and that such a person’s spirit always becomes the ally of his reason. He says, ‘But spirit partnering with the appetites to do what reason has decided should not be done—I do not imagine you would say that you had ever seen that, either in yourself or in anyone else’ (ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν κοινωνήσαντα, αἰρόντος λόγου μὴ δεῖν, ἀντιπράττειν, οἶμαι σε οὐκ ἂν φάναι γεγυμένου ποτέ ἐν σαυτῷ τοῦ τοιούτου ἀιθέσθαι, οἴμαι δ’ οὐδ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ, 440 b 4–7). And later, Socrates claims that ‘in the faction that takes place in the soul, it [spirit] is far more likely to take arms on the side of the rationally calculating element’ (ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν, 440 b 4–6). Thus, Socrates seems to be making claims about the way things typically are, and not just the way they ought to be. Second, if Socrates intended only the normative sense, then we must think of the cases presented in book 4, where he emphasizes spirit’s role as the ally of reason, as cases where the spirited part has been properly educated. But we have no reason to think that Leontius, for example, has gone through anything like the education
that Socrates advocates in books 2 and 3, or indeed any education that Socrates would fully endorse. In short, there is nothing in this context to suggest that Leontius has been trained to listen to his reason; instead, this is depicted as something he naturally aspires to. Finally, if Socrates intended only the normative sense of 'natural', then we might expect him to claim that the appetites are also the natural ally of reason, since surely it is right, correct, and healthy for the appetites to ally themselves with or at least obey reason as well. Yet Socrates does not make such a claim for the appetites.

There is a second problem with the prevalent interpretation of spirit. According to this interpretation, spirit aims for the fine and honourable, or for the kalon, where the content of what is fine is set by societal norms. We know, however, that Socrates does not think that what is truly fine and honourable is determined by societal norms. Instead, he thinks that there is a fact of the matter about what is truly fine and honourable; thus, in Republic 6 Socrates claims that there is a form of the fine (507 B 4–7), and in Republic 10 he provides an account of what it is to be truly fine (601 D 3–6). Any interpretation, then, that holds that the spirited part aims for the fine and the honourable should make some reference to Socrates’ account of the fine and to the relationship between spirited desires and what is truly fine.

What, then, has attracted so many commentators to the idea that spirit’s conception of the fine is exclusively due to social norms? Proponents of this approach might appeal to two sources of evidence, but neither, as I will argue, establishes their view. First, as I mentioned above, many commentators have thought that the spirited part is the primary target of the education described in books 2 and 3 of the Republic; this loosely suggests that the spirited part is particularly responsive to social and cultural norms as they are conveyed through stories and cultural products. But this line of reasoning is inconclusive, since Socrates emphasizes that both reason and spirit are the primary targets of education, and moreover, that it is reason that is being educated by the norms conveyed in the stories presented. In Republic 3, for example, following his discussion of the ideal education, Socrates states:

So I, for one, would claim that it is to deal with these two things, so it seems, that a god has given two crafts to human beings—musical training [μουσικήν] and physical training [γυμναστικήν]—to deal with the philosophical [τὸ φιλόσοφον] and spirited elements [τὸ θυμοειδές] . . . so that they
might be harmonized with one another by being stretched and relaxed to the appropriate degree. (411 B 4–412 A 2)

And in Republic 4, following his characterization of reason and spirit, Socrates says:

Then isn’t it appropriate for the rationally calculating element \([τῷ λογιστικῷ]\) to rule, since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul; and for the spirited kind \([τῷ θυμοειδεί]\) to obey it and be its ally? . . . Now, as we were saying, isn’t it a mixture of musical \([μουσικῆς]\) and physical training \([γυμναστικῆς]\) that makes these elements concordant, tightening and nurturing the first with fine words and learning, while relaxing, soothing, and making gentle the second by means of harmony and rhythm? (441 E 3–442 A 3)

These two passages, then, claim that both reason and spirit are targeted by education, and they suggest even further that it is the rational part that is acquiring the right beliefs and norms, while the spirited part is primarily affected by physical training and harmony and rhythm. Of course, there can be little doubt that Socrates thinks that we are deeply influenced by cultural norms, but there is no reason to think that spirit is the part solely or even primarily affected by these norms. On the contrary, Socrates claims that it is reason that is primarily affected, at least in the case of early education (though we needn’t go so far as to deny that spirit and possibly the appetites are influenced by them as well: see e.g. 442 C 8–D 3; 548 B 2–C 1).

A second, stronger, reason for thinking that the spirited part’s conception of what is fine and honourable is dependent on societal norms is Socrates’ claim in books 8 and 9 that spirit wants victory, honour, and high repute and so seems concerned to attain the esteem of others. Commentators might argue that if public honour and esteem are important to spirit (since they are conducive to self-

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8 See Wilberding, ‘Second-Best Morality’, 361–4, for further arguments for the claim that it is reason, and not the spirited part, that is given the correct norms and beliefs in early education.

9 It might be argued that Socrates claims that children do not possess reason (441 A 7–B 2), and since education is directed towards children in the first instance, he cannot think that reason is the part influenced by the normative aspects of education. But when Socrates claims that small children do not have reason, it is not likely that he means that they do not have reason at all; instead he probably means that the reason of young children is not fully developed and so capable of functioning (i.e. giving reasons) as it is in some adults. See Wilberding, ‘Second-Best Morality’, 363 n. 53, for more on this point.
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worth and self-respect), then it must be attuned to social norms, since it needs to publicly exemplify those norms in order to attain the esteem of others. But this line of reasoning also fails to show that spirit’s conception of the fine is determined by social norms, for this view assumes that what people honour and admire is completely unrelated to what is truly fine and honourable. Why not think instead that people tend to honour and esteem what is truly fine? On this view, it is what is truly fine that shapes social norms about what is fine and honourable. If this is the case, then spirit, with its aim of attaining self-respect and the respect of others, should be seen as aspiring to be truly fine.

Someone might counter that what people admire is wildly variable, and so, on the reasonable assumption that what is truly fine is constant and stable, someone who wants the admiration of others will have to aim at whatever people happen to find admirable, and not at what is truly fine and honourable. But it is not obviously true that what people admire is wildly variable. Instead, there might be some things that people tend to admire with some universality. If so, spirit might make this its primary target. There is evidence that this is the way Socrates sees the matter in his description of the timocratic or honour-loving city and individual. Socrates does not describe the city and individual as honouring, or aiming to be honoured for, a wild variety of things. Instead, there is a smaller range of things that the timocratic city and individual honour: success in war, athletic competition, and politics (547a ff.). Perhaps, then, there is some unity, some single property, underlying these things that people tend to admire with some universality, and this property bears an important relationship to what is truly fine.

In sum, then, the current dominant interpretation is on the right track in so far as it claims that spirited motivations revolve around the desire for self-worth and self-respect, and thus around our own perception, and the perception of others, of our standing in relation to the ideal of being fine and honourable. But it fails in so far as it does not explain why spirit is the natural ally of reason, nor spirit’s relationship to what is truly fine. It is reasonable to think that the source of these difficulties lies in its claim that spirit’s conception

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle claims that people pursue honour from others to convince themselves that they are good (1095a27–36), and to confirm their own view of themselves as good (1159a19–26). Cooper, ‘Human Motivation’, 14–15, explicitly claims that the esteem of others is a normal presupposition of self-esteem.
of what is fine and noble is due to social norms. Thus, we should turn to Plato’s own account of what is truly fine.

4. To kalon and the truly fine and honourable person

Let us, then, get some sense of what Socrates thinks it is to be truly fine and honourable. The concept of the fine, to kalon, is, of course, rich and difficult to elucidate, in part because it has both moral and aesthetic connotations; this is why it is variably translated as ‘noble’, ‘honourable’, ‘admirable’, ‘fine’, and ‘beautiful’. My aim here is not to undertake an exhaustive examination of Socrates’ conception of the fine. Instead, I focus on a few key claims to arrive at a basic picture of the fine, with the aim of using this picture to understand what it is to be a truly fine and honourable person—a person worth admiring.

We can begin by noting that Socrates claims that all and only good things are truly fine and beautiful (457 B 5–7; 452 D 2–E 2); in other words, the good and the fine are, at the least, coextensive. In Republic Socrates sketches a teleological account of what it is to be good and fine. He says, ‘Aren’t the virtue or excellence [ἀρετή], beauty [κάλλος], and correctness [ὀρθότης] of each manufactured item, living creature, and activity related to nothing but the use for which each is made or naturally developed?’ (601 D 3–6). In Republic Socrates makes a related claim, where he argues that something is a good of its kind when it performs its function [ἕργον] well (352 D 10–354 A 5). These claims suggest that if something has a function or purpose, then it is good and fine to the extent that it is able to perform its function or fulfil its purpose, and so achieve its goal.

But Socrates also consistently associates goodness with the sort of order that constitutes unity. So, for example, in Republic he claims that reason, which aims for the good of the whole soul, makes its decisions with a view to creating and maintaining internal order, and that the individual who is ruled by reason ‘becomes entirely one, temperate, and harmonious’ (443 D 5–E 3). And in Republic he claims that the greatest good for the organization of the city is that which binds it together and makes it one, and the greatest evil that which tears it apart and makes it many instead of one (462 A 2–B 1).

It seems, then, that Socrates thinks that something is good and
fine to the extent that its parts or elements are organized or ordered in such a way as to contribute to it realizing its particular function, purpose, or goal; when this state is achieved, the entity in question is truly one and unified. Accordingly, Socrates must think that any object in this condition will display certain features that command our admiration, and which might reasonably be considered aesthetic features. And this thought is reasonable, for any object in this condition will, for example, be powerful and effective, in so far as it easily and fully performs its function. In addition, it will be integrated, in so far as each of its parts aims at and contributes to one thing: fulfilling its function. And finally it will be harmonious, in so far as none of its parts detracts from or conflict with the aim of the others.11

What, then, is it for a person to be truly good and fine? It follows from this account that a person is good and fine to the extent that she has a function, purpose, or goal, and all of her parts or elements are ordered and organized such that she can realize it. But how does Socrates conceive of our function, purpose, or goal?

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues that the human function consists in exercising or realizing that which makes us human, or sets us apart from other animals; and he goes on to argue that the human function consists in rational activity, which includes, *inter alia*, reasoning about what to do and acting in accordance with those conclusions (1097b35–1098a15). A passage in Republic 9 (588b–589b) suggests that Socrates has the same idea in mind. More specifically, Socrates presents a metaphorical image of the human soul which suggests that (1) what makes us human is our reason and thus that our true function, purpose, or goal is rational activity, including reasoning about what to do and acting in accordance with those conclusions, and (2) we implicitly take this to be our purpose, in so far as we identify with our rational conclusions.

11 My account of the fine is similar to Lear’s recent account in ‘Beauty’. She claims that ‘according to Plato, where a beautiful thing’s good is its function, its beauty will lie in the way its parts are well suited in themselves and in proportion to each other—in the way they are ordered—to contribute to its proper work’ (108). Lear, however, stresses perfection, and not power, integrity, and harmony, as the relevant aesthetic feature: ‘the fact that beautiful and fine things delight us as (appearing) perfect explains the very close connection between *tolon* and praise (e.g. 492c). Praise, admiration, and honor are natural responses to seeing (either physically or intellectually) the excellence that beautiful things manifest’ (107); and, ‘the pleasure in experiencing something as *tolon* could . . . be one of wonder at how appropriately the various parts of the thing are ordered to its end’ (108).
about what to do, and so naturally aspire to live up to them. Let us turn to this passage.

In Republic 9 Socrates creates ‘an image of the soul in words’ to show the effects of justice and injustice on the soul (588 b–589 b). He asks us to imagine a human, a lion, and a many-headed beast joined together; he then asks us to imagine that the image of a human surrounds this creature, so that from the outside, it looks like a single entity, a human being. The human represents reason, the lion represents spirit, and the many-headed beast represents the appetites. Socrates depicts the just person’s soul as one whose inner human being (reason) has mastery over the whole person and who takes care of the lion and the many-headed beast, with the result that they are friends with each other and with himself. The unjust person’s soul is depicted as one whose inner human being (reason) has been starved and weakened and so is dragged along wherever the other two lead, as they bite, fight, and devour one another.

We can ask two questions about this passage. First, why does Socrates liken reason to the human being? And second, why is the image of the human being dragged about by the other parts supposed to dissuade us from pursuing injustice? It is reasonable to suppose that Socrates likens reason to the human being because it is our reason that makes us human, and thus distinguishes us from other animals. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that Socrates, like Aristotle, considers the human function, purpose, or goal to consist in rational activity, including reasoning about what to do and living in accordance with those determinations. And indeed, in Republic 1 Socrates claims that the function of the human soul is living, which crucially involves deliberating (βουλεύεσθαι), which is the job of the rational part, and ruling (ἄρχειν) (353 b 1–8).

But why should we care if the other parts drag around the human? One answer—also suggested by the fact that Socrates likens reason to the human—is that we tend to identify with our rational conclusions about what we should do, and so naturally aspire to live in accordance with them. This is why the image of the other parts dragging around the human is supposed to dissuade us from pursuing injustice: it suggests a life in which we are weak and not in control. And certainly this claim is psychologically plausible: when there is a conflict between our rational determinations about what we ought to do and, for example, our appetites, we do tend to think that our rational determinations represent what we truly believe,
and so feel weak and ashamed when we fail to live up to them and proud when we succeed.\textsuperscript{12}

It follows from all of this that Socrates thinks that a person is truly good and fine to the extent that the elements of her soul are organized and ordered in such a way that they contribute to her ability to engage in rational activity, including living in accordance with her reason. And indeed, immediately following the metaphorical description of just and unjust souls that we have been considering, Socrates says that this conception of the fine is the basis of much of what we admire in ourselves and others. He says:

\begin{quote}
shouldn’t we claim that this is also the basis of the conventional views [νόμιμα] about what is fine [καλά] and what is shameful [αἰσχρά]: what is fine [καλά] is what subordinates the beastlike element in our nature to the human one—or better, perhaps, to the divine, whereas what is shameful [αἰσχρά] is what enslaves the tame element to the savage. (§89c 7–d 4)
\end{quote}

Thus, not only does Socrates think that what is truly fine is to act in accordance with our reason, despite appetitive temptations to the contrary, but he claims in addition that this conception of what is truly fine is reflected, albeit perhaps obliquely and imperfectly, in social norms.

And again, this claim is reasonable, for this condition of the soul—acting in accordance with what we think is best despite appetitive fears and temptations—might well be thought to be the basis of a variety of interrelated admirable traits, some with moral and others with aesthetic connotations. So, for example, this condition of the soul is the basis of courage, strength of will, and self-control, all of which are naturally considered admirable. Relatedly, someone with this condition of the soul will be powerful and effective, in so far as she easily and gracefully accomplishes what she sets out to do. And finally, someone with this condition of the soul will be integrated and harmonious, in so far as each of the parts of her soul contributes to her acting in accordance with her reason, and none conflicts and pulls away. Such an individual, then, could plausibly

\textsuperscript{12} Why would Socrates think it is our rational conclusions that we identify with when we experience psychological conflict? He does not explicitly say, but it is likely that it has something to do with the activity involved in reasoning. When we invest our own activity in determining what to do and value, as opposed to passively accepting, for example, the dictates of our desires, then we feel that these values truly come from us, or that they are truly our own, and so we identify with them and strive to live up to them.
be said to possess what we might call a beautiful soul. Now, I do not want to suggest that Socrates thinks that this condition of the soul is the basis of everything that we could admire about a human being, but instead, that he thinks, plausibly, that it is the basis of a universal or natural class of admirable traits.

5. Spirit, reason, and the fine

Let us, then, return to the question of this paper, and use this account of the fine to illuminate Socrates’ conception of the spirited part of the soul. The spirited part of the soul wants self-respect; it wants to be fine and honourable, and to be honoured and admired for this. Being fine and honourable is not, however, as the current standard interpretation claims, determined by social norms. Instead, what it is to be fine and honourable is to engage in rational activity, including living up to our rational view of how we ought to behave, despite appetitive temptations to the contrary.

My contention is that spirit will go for that aspect of being fine that lends itself to self-worth, namely, living up to our rational views about how we should behave, despite the appetites. In other words, spirit aims to be courageous, strong-willed, and self-controlled. Someone with this condition of the soul will have self-respect and self-worth, in so far as she sees herself as living up to her own ideas about how she should live, as well as the respect of others, in so far as she publicly displays her courage, strength of will and self-control. This condition of the soul, then, is what spirit really wants and aims to achieve.¹³

It is clear, then, that my account explains why spirit is the natural ally of reason: the spirited part aims to be fine and honourable, but being fine and honourable just is living up to our rational views, despite appetitive deterrents. Thus, in cases of psychological conflict, spirit allies with reason, and pushes the person to live up to his

¹³ Someone might object that if spirit aims for the fine, and if being fine involves rational activity in general, including both reasoning itself and acting in accordance with reason, then we should infer that spirit motivates us to engage in reasoning itself; this, however, is reason’s job. My contention is that spirit naturally pushes us towards the second element of rational activity, acting in accordance with reason. Why? Spirit wants self-esteem. Acting in accordance with our reason despite appetitive fears and temptations is a universal or natural way of attaining self-esteem and the esteem of others, largely because success and failures with respect to this aspect of rational activity are so manifest, both to oneself and to others.
or her rational determinations. My account also captures the unity underlying the diverse motivations that Socrates attributes to the spirited part, for, as I shall now argue, in all cases the focus is on spirit’s interest in displaying its ability to live up to the person’s rational views despite the appetites.

As we have seen, in Republic 4 Socrates emphasizes spirit’s role in motivating us to act in accordance with our rational view of what is best in the face of appetitive temptations to the contrary. Recall that Leontius is angry with his appetitive desire to look at corpses. But why do the desires make him angry? According to the standard interpretation, Leontius is angry at his desires because he has been educated to think that looking at corpses is shameful. But as we have seen, this is not how Socrates elaborates on the case. He says:

οὐκοὐν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφην, πολλακοῦ ἀλθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνταί τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίαι, λοιδοροῦντά τε αὑτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ ὥσπερ δυοὶ στασιαζόντων σύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ ταὐτοῦ; (440 Α 9–Β 4)

And don’t we often notice on other occasions that when appetite forces someone contrary to his rational calculation, he reproaches himself and feels anger at the thing in him that is doing the forcing; and just as if there were two warring factions, such a person’s spirit becomes the ally of his reason?

This suggests that Leontius is angry at his desires simply because they threaten to motivate him to act against his reason, and thus threaten to make him see himself as someone who is shamefully weak and not in control. This in turn suggests that the conception of the fine and honourable that Leontius aspires to involves living in accordance with reason, despite appetitive temptations.

As we have seen, Socrates claims that the virtue of the spirited part is courage, and he defines courage as the ability to preserve through pleasures and pains reason’s beliefs about what should and should not be feared. This aspect of spirit is emphasized in Socrates’ description of noble men, where he calls attention to spirit’s ability to withstand appetitive pains to do what the person thinks is right. Thus, the noble man who has been unjust strives to regain his view of himself as fine and honourable by withstanding just punishment, even in the face of appetitive desires. Socrates says, ‘Isn’t it true that the nobler he is, the less capable he is of feeling angry if he suffers hunger, cold, or the like at the hands of someone he
believes to be inflicting this on him justly; and won’t his spirit, as I say, refuse to be aroused?’ (440c 2–7). Similarly, the man who has been treated unjustly, or who has been treated as though he does not deserve respect, strives to show his worth by courageously pursuing the perpetrator of the injustice, despite the appetites. Socrates says, ‘And even if it suffers hunger, cold, and every imposition of that sort, doesn’t it stand firm and win out over them, not ceasing its noble efforts until it achieves its purpose, or dies, or like a dog being called to heel by a shepherd, is called back by the reason alongside it and becomes gentle?’ (440c 9–11). In both cases, then, spirit strives to make the person courageous, strong-willed, and self-controlled.

This account of spirit likewise explains Socrates’ characterization of the timocrat. The timocrat is ruled by the spirited part of the soul, and so his dominant aim is to be fine and honourable and to be honoured and admired for this. According to my account, then, the person dominated by spirit will aim to be courageous, strong-willed, and self-controlled—to prevail over the appetites—and to display those traits publicly. And this is exactly what we find in Socrates’ description of the timocrat. In *Republic* 9 Socrates explicitly states that the timocrat aims to be honoured for his courage (582c 5–8). In *Republic* 8 Socrates describes the timocrat as interested in victory in war and sports; he is also interested in ruling, but he bases his claim to rule on his exploits in war (549a 4–7). But winning in each of these venues means that one’s courage, strength of will, and self-control are on public display for others to admire. Thus, spirit, with its aim of being and being seen as honourable, will naturally gravitate towards these arenas for action.

This interpretation also explains a prima facie puzzling aspect of Socrates’ characterization of the timocrat. Socrates claims that it is best to be ruled by reason, or to love and value wisdom more than

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44 Someone might object here that the timocrat cannot be characterized as courageous. After all, Socrates defines courage as preserving reason’s beliefs in the face of temptation, but the timocrat is not ruled by reason, and so cannot be following reason’s beliefs. But while it is true that the timocrat is not ruled by reason in the strong sense of the term (that is, he does not love and value wisdom more than anything else, and he does not know the truth about what is really good), we should not deny that he uses his reason in a weaker sense of the term (for example, it is his reason that calculates how best to win a battle) and thus that his spirit shows its courage by pushing him to follow through on those calculations. Thus, while Socrates might not consider the timocrat truly or fully courageous, there is no problem with claiming that he aims for courage, and perhaps attains an image of it.
anything else. He clearly thinks, however, that being ruled by the spirited part of the soul is second best. But why should it be better to be ruled by the love of honour and admiration than by, for example, the appetitive element’s love of money or freedom? Socrates seems to think that the answer lies, at least in part, in the effect of loving certain things on the condition of the soul. More specifically, he seems to think that loving certain objects results in more or less psychic order. Thus, he criticizes the oligarch on the grounds that he is not free from internal faction and thus is not a single person, but somehow twofold (554 D 8–E 2). At the same time, however, he characterizes the oligarch as more respectable than others since his better appetites generally master his worse (554 E 2–5). Similarly, he criticizes the democratic individual on the grounds that he pursues whatever he happens to fancy, and thus that there is neither order nor necessity in his life (561 C 7–E 1). Thus, Socrates must think that loving honour and admiration results in more order and harmony in the soul than loving money or freedom. But why think this?

The current dominant interpretation, which holds that the spirited part loves being fine and honourable, where the content of what is fine and honourable is set by variable social norms, cannot readily explain this. But my view can. I claim that what it is to be fine and honourable is to live in accordance with your rational views, vanquishing appetitive deterrents, and thus to be courageous, strong-willed, and self-disciplined. But of course, this does require having an ordered soul; more specifically, it requires the subjugation of the appetites. Of course, the love of money also requires the subjugation of some of the appetites; this is why it is better to be an oligarch than a democrat. But the love of money does not always demand restraining the appetites. Thus, Socrates claims that when

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15 Socrates characterizes the aim of his discussion of degenerate cities and souls in books 8 and 9 as determining which man is best and which is worst (544 A 2–9); and at the end of the discussion Glaucon ranks all five in the order of how they fare with respect to both virtue and vice and happiness and unhappiness (580 B 6–8).

16 Wilberding, ‘Second-Best Morality’, forcefully raises this excellent question. While Wilberding notes that Plato must ground the superiority of being ruled by spirit in the order that it creates in the soul, he does not explain how this might work. He is more interested in highlighting the idea that desire for public esteem involves caring about the opinions of others, which, while not as morally admirable as caring for others themselves, is more admirable than the desire for money, which does not involve valuing others at all. But while Wilberding’s explanation for why being ruled by honour is second best might be congenial to contemporary moral theorists, I see no evidence that Plato held anything like this view.
the oligarch has other people’s money to spend, he indulges his appetites (554 D 4–7). Accordingly, the oligarch will indulge his unnecessary desires when he can—certainly more often than the pure timocrat—and thus they will be strengthened and he will gradually lose his ability to keep them in check (559 B–562 A).

Of course, the timocrat himself is not entirely effective at subjugating the appetites. The timocrat in the timocratic city is described as enjoying money and appetitive pleasures in secret (548 A 5–B 2); and the timocratic individual disdains money when he is young but comes to love it when he is older (549 A 9–B 4). Socrates’ explanation for both of these cases is that each shares in the money-lover’s nature: the timocratic city is like an oligarchy in virtue of the fact that its rulers love money and indulging some appetites (548 A 4–C 1); and the timocratic individual is explicitly described as partaking in the money-lover’s nature (549 A 9–B 3). All of this implies that there is something unstable about being ruled by the love of honour: the timocratic city and timocrat cannot fully and effectively pursue what they value. Why not?

In both cases, Socrates claims that the problem is that they have not had the type of musical training that develops their reason. Thus, he claims that the timocrats in the timocratic city enjoy their pleasures in secret, and run away from the law like boys from their father, since they have not been educated by persuasion but by force (548 B 5–7); and he goes on to say: ‘This is because they have neglected the true Muse, the companion of discussion [λόγων] and philosophy [φιλοσοφίας], and honoured physical training [γυμναστικήν] more than musical training [μουσικῆς]’ (548 B 7–C 2). He claims that the timocratic individual ‘is not pure in his attitude to virtue, since he lacks the best guardian [φύλακος] . . . reason [λόγου] mixed with musical training [μουσικῇ] . . . only it dwells within the person who possesses it as the lifelong preserver [σωτήρ] of his virtue’ (549 B 4–7).

The idea seems to be, then, that the rational part of these individuals is weak: they have not developed their ability to know and understand the truth about what is good and bad; accordingly, they are not immune to the persuasive power of unruly appetitive desires, which make their objects appear good. These individuals, then, are not able to remain firm in their beliefs about what is truly good and bad in the face of conflicting appearances, and thus they ultimately indulge their appetitive desires. This explains, at least in
part, why it is best to be ruled by reason, or to love and value wisdom more than anything else, for it is only when we are ruled by reason that we develop our ability to know and understand the truth about what is good and bad, and about why certain things appear good to us; and so it is only when we are ruled by reason that we have the ability to reason with unruly desires, or persuade ourselves that some inclinations, despite appearances, are not worth pursuing. \(^{17}\)

Before turning to possible objections to my account, I want to return to the topic of education, for we are now in a position to understand Socrates’ claims about the effect of education on the rational and spirited parts of the soul. Recall that education consists in two parts, musical training, including the content of poetry and rhythm and harmony, and physical training. Recall as well that Socrates claims that the content of poetry is primarily directed towards the reasoning part, while physical education and harmony and rhythm are directed towards the spirited part (\(441\ E\ 4–442\ A\ 2;\ 441\ E\ 3–442\ A\ 3\)). But why should we think that physical education and rhythm and harmony train the spirited part of the soul?

On my interpretation, the spirited part aims to be fine and honourable; that is, the spirited part aims for courage, strength of will, and self-control. But there is good reason for thinking that these traits can be nurtured through physical training, which requires that one endure appetitive pleasures, pains, and temptations in the pursuit of a goal. Thus, Socrates claims that physical training makes someone full of pride and spirit, and more courageous (ἀνδρειότερος) than he was before (\(411\ C\)). On the other hand, someone who focuses on musical training and neglects physical training ‘charms his spirit [τὸν θυμόν], [and] the next result is that he melts it and dissolves it completely until he has cut out, so to speak, the very sinews of his soul and makes himself “a feeble warrior”’ (\(411\ B\ 3–6\)).

The mechanism by which music proper educates the spirited part is more difficult to articulate. Socrates claims that rhythm and harmony initially soften the spirit and make it useful (\(411\ A\ 3–B\ 2\)), and that rhythm and harmony relax, soothe, and make gentle the spirited part (\(441\ E\ 6–442\ A\ 3\)). Clearly, then, Socrates thinks that the

\(^{17}\) See my ‘Tripartite’ and ‘Soul Division and Mimesis in Republic X’, in P. Destrée and F.-G. Herrmann (eds.), Plato and the Poets (Leiden, 2011), 283–98, for an account of how appetitive desires involve appearances of value. And see my ‘Reasoning with the Irrational: Moral Psychology in the Protagoras’, Ancient Philosophy, 26 (2006), 243–58, for an account of reason’s ability to persuade us that the objects of our desires are not really good.
spirited part, which is naturally aggressive and assertive, is somehow quieted by rhythm and harmony. Presumably this makes spirit capable of listening to reason, as opposed to reacting fiercely and quickly to perceived attacks on the person’s honour.\(^\text{18}\)

All of this suggests, then, that we should understand the overall structure of early education in the following way: the content of poetry gives reason (or proto-reason) the right beliefs and so the right aims and direction in life. This, among other things, puts the person in a better position to grasp the reasons for certain normative claims later in life (402 A 1–4). Thus, Socrates says that if someone neglects musical training, his reason becomes weak, deaf, and blind (411 C 9–D 7). Physical training provides spirit with the strength of will to push the person to live up to his or her goals, despite appetitive deterrents. At the same time, rhythm and harmony soothe the spirited part of us, so that it is capable of listening to reason. The result is an internally and externally integrated, harmonious, and graceful person. Thus, Socrates says that someone whose reason has not received the proper musical training ‘lives in awkward ignorance without rhythm or grace’ (411 D 7–E 3), presumably because his reason does not give his life a stable, single direction. Conversely, someone who has been properly trained in music and physical education is ‘most in harmony—far more so than the one who merely attunes his strings to one another’ (412 A 2–7).\(^\text{19}\)

In closing, I would like to consider two passages that might appear to conflict with my account of the aim of spirit. The first is the description of Odysseus, whose spirit is described as conflicting with his reason, and the second is Socrates’ characterization of the oligarch, whose spirit is described as loving and admiring money.

Socrates describes Odysseus’ spirit as conflicting with his rea-

\(^\text{18}\) I do not want to suggest that rhythm and harmony are exclusively directed at the spirited part, and thus that their only function is to soothe the spirited part. Rhythm and harmony might also be directed towards reason, and may serve the additional function of making the person sensitive and attracted to harmony and order as realized in other objects, actions, and the human soul. See M. Schofield, ‘Music All Pow’rful’, in M. McPherran (ed.), Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide (Cambridge, 2010), 229–48.

\(^\text{19}\) This explains why it is better to be an auxiliary than a timocrat, for the auxiliary has received the proper musical education and so has the right beliefs about what is good and bad. This gives his life a true and stable direction and also puts him in the best position to understand for himself, in so far as he is able, the reason why certain things are good and bad, thus providing him with the ability to remain firm in his beliefs in the face of conflicting appearances. Thus, the auxiliary is better placed than the timocrat to attain what is truly fine.
son, which might appear to pose a strong counter-example to my account. But on closer inspection, we can see that it does not. Socrates tells us that Odysseus’ spirit is angry. But why? Odysseus is angry because the behaviour of the suitors and his maids implies that he is someone who does not deserve honour and respect. His immediate spirited response, then, is to eliminate the source of the disrespect (i.e. the maids and the suitors) and to show that he is fine and admirable, and so worthy of respect. He can accomplish both of these aims by using his courage—his ability to act on his reason despite potential appetitive fears and temptations—to eliminate the offending party, thereby showing that he is someone to be admired and respected. And this is exactly what his spirit aims to do, for there is no reason to think that it is not his reason that recommends that he eliminate the offensive behaviour. After all, his reason does not recommend ignoring this insult, but rather waiting until he can execute a more powerful revenge. The trouble for Odysseus is that his reason counsels both that this behaviour is disrespectful and should be eliminated and that it is better to wait. Thus, Odysseus’ spirit must endure feeling shamed by the disrespectful behaviour and not doing anything about it when its immediate impulse is to eliminate the behaviour promptly and show his strength and power. We should note, though, that Odysseus’ spirit does eventually heed his reason: Odysseus does refrain from immediate action. And indeed, in Republic 3 Socrates actually recommends that Odysseus’ story be told to young children to provide an example of someone who perseveres in the face of difficulties (390 D 1–6).

Finally, Socrates claims that the spirit of an individual who is ruled by appetite’s love of money will not be allowed to ‘admire or honour anything except wealth and wealthy people, or to love being honoured for anything besides the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to it’ (553 C 9–D 8). Does this pose a challenge to my view? No. I do not want to hold that spirit cannot be made to aspire to and admire things other than courage, strength of will, and self-control. Instead, I simply want to claim that this is what it naturally admires and aspires to. And indeed, the fact that the oligarch’s spirit honours money is seen as a deviation, for Socrates says that since the oligarch is so concerned with money, he is unwilling to spend it for the sake of fame, and so ‘is a worthless individual.

20 See Wilberding, ‘Second-Best Morality’, 364–8, for a similar account of the conflict between Odysseus’ reason and spirit.
contestant in the city for any prize of victory or any of the other fine things \(\tau\omega\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\) the love of honour craves’ (554 e 6–555 a 1). The suggestion, then, is that the ‘love of honour’ in the oligarchic individual, the spirited part, is ultimately unsatisfied, since it is not getting what it naturally desires. It is also worth noting that admiring wealth does require some suppression of the appetites, so spirit does have a job to do in the oligarchic soul, as opposed to the democratic or tyrannical soul. This explains why explicit mention of the spirited part drops out in Socrates’ description of the democrat and the tyrant: as the individual starts to give the appetites more and more control in setting his aims, there is nothing for spirit to strive for.

6. Conclusion: lessons in moral psychology

Despite the initial challenges it poses, Socrates’ account of spirit illuminates two important features of our moral psychology. Assume for the moment that reason discovers moral truths and provides some motivation to act in accordance with them—assume, for example, that reason discovers what is just and motivates us to be just because doing so is good or beneficial. Two things follow. The first is that we have two sources of moral motivation: the desire to do what is just because we recognize that doing so is good or beneficial, and the desire to do what is just so that we can see ourselves, and others can see us, as acting and feeling in tune with our rational beliefs. Thus, Socrates is right to call spirit an auxiliary, for spirit, with its aim of attaining self-worth through living up to our rational views, provides an auxiliary form of moral motivation.

Second, Socrates’ account of spirit points to a certain link between morality and self-interest: namely, when we succeed in doing what reason has determined is right or just, we can see ourselves as acting in accordance with our reason, and thus as being honourable, or as possessing what we might call integrity, with both its moral and aesthetic connotations. That is, when we act in accordance with our reason, we transcend selfish inclinations in order to do what is good and beneficial, and we make ourselves integrated and in harmony with what we really are: a human being. Doing what reason deems just, then, allows us to be fine and beautiful, and thus gratifies our spirited desires.

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