In this subtle and interesting book, Ferrari argues forcefully for a new interpretation of the vexed analogy between the city and soul in Plato’s Republic. Along the way he offers original insights into several of the most contentious features of the Republic, including Socrates’ aims in deploying the city-soul analogy and his account of the values and motives of the philosopher-king.

In Chapter 1, Ferrari presents a character study of Glaucon and Adeimantus intended to illuminate their request for a defense of justice. According to Ferrari, Glaucon and Adeimantus are reluctant quietists: though attracted to political rule, they have retreated from aspiring to it because they see their society, and in particular its democratic tendencies, as defective and so unworthy of their efforts. They have chosen instead to pursue self-contained excellence: the perfection of their souls. The brothers want a defense of justice that justifies this decision. Socrates aims, however, are more comprehensive. He endeavors to provide an account of justice that answers to their needs, while also moving them away from quietism by showing them in what circumstances and for what reasons they might pursue political rule. According to Ferrari, the analogy between the city and soul is designed to accomplish this goal.

In Chapter 2, Ferrari reviews a dominant interpretation of the city-soul analogy, as well as the problems for this approach, as discussed by Bernard Williams in his classic article, ‘The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic.’ According to Williams, the city-soul analogy involves a commitment to two claims: (i) a city is F if and only if its
people are F, and (ii) the explanation of a city’s being F is the same as the explanation of a person’s being F. Unfortunately, however, Socrates’ joint commitment to (i) and (ii) appears to be problematic. Williams notes that by (ii) the just city and the just soul are structurally isomorphic, which means that each contains a rational, spirited, and appetitive element. Plausibly, the rational element in the city is made up of individuals who are ruled by reason, the spirited element is made up of individuals ruled by spirit, and the appetitive element is comprised of individuals ruled by appetite. But then the just city contains individuals who are ruled by spirit and appetite, and this conflicts with (i), since Socrates does not think that an individual who is ruled by spirit or appetite is just.

Williams suggests that we might try to get around this problem by revising (i) in the following way: a city is F if and only if the leading, most influential or prominent citizens are F. But Williams notes that this revised principle conflicts with Socrates’ characterization of the democratic city. If the revised version of (i) is true, then the most prominent citizens of a democratic city would be like the democratic individual, namely, erratic people who pursue whatever they happen to desire. But this is not how Socrates describes the leading citizens – the general populace – who make up a democracy. Rather, the populace contains every kind of character type, including, presumably, timocratic, oligarchic, and philosophic sorts of individuals.

Ferrari contends that we should reject both formulations of (i), along with the corresponding thought that the rational element in the city is made up of people ruled by reason, and so on. The just city and the just soul have the same structure and that is all that can be said for the relationship between them: ‘The fact that an individual has a character constructed analogously to a certain kind of city does not entail that he should
be a member of it; likewise, the analogy has nothing to say about whether the virtues of virtuous individuals are to be found in the members of any class within the virtuous city’ (44). As evidence for this, Ferrari notes that in Republic iv, Socrates characterizes the virtues of wisdom and courage differently when discussing individuals in the city and individuals considered in isolation. For example, the wise ruler knows what is good for the city, while the wise individual knows what is good for himself; similarly, the auxiliary is brave with regard to facing dangers in the city; the courageous individual is brave with regard to facing all kinds of dangers and temptations, more often of a personal nature. The same is true for justice and self-control.

Ferrari is careful to note that the analogy does not rule out the notion that just individuals might inhabit the just city, or that wise individuals make up the guardian class, or that courageous individuals make up the auxiliaries, or even that the city is made of self-controlled individuals. The analogy is simply silent on these matters; it does not allow us to peer into the souls of the individuals who inhabit the city. Ferrari holds that if, for example, the wise individual is the ruler in the city, and knows both what is good for himself and for the whole, then this is a result of regularities of human nature (and not in virtue of the analogy), such as the tendency of good statesmen to be thoughtful people, and of thoughtful people to know what is good for themselves.

In chapter 3, Ferrari argues that we ought to understand the analogy as a proportional metaphor or simile. A proportional metaphor or simile states or implies a ratio, and is convertible or reversible. So the correspondence of the city and the soul implies both a comparison of the soul to a city (e.g., reason is the ruler of the soul), and a comparison of the city to the soul (e.g., rulers are the intelligence of the city). According
to Ferrari, ‘it is these points of likeness – not causal relations, nor relations of whole and part – that bind each city to the equivalent soul and each soul to the equivalent city’ (65).

Ferrari thinks that this pattern is exemplified more clearly still in the discussion of timocracy, oligarchy, and democracy. Ferrari argues for this by noting differences between the rulers of timocratic cities and the timocratic man. For example, the rulers in a timocratic city and the timocratic man differ in their attitudes to money: the rulers in a timocratic city are secretive and stingy with their money, but passionate about it, while the timocratic man is at first contemptuous about money, but later openly enjoys it. The timocratic man ‘…lives a complacent and unconflicted life, quite different from that of the rulers in the timocracy – different not just in its circumstances but in its ethical and psychological tenor’ (68). Thus, the timocratic man has the character of that regime, not the character of the rulers in that regime. In the same fashion, Ferrari argues that the rulers in an oligarchy are not oligarchic men. Rulers in an oligarchy are specifically said to include the idle, spendthrift rich, which is the very opposite of the tightfisted oligarchic man. Again, the oligarchic man resembles the corresponding oligarchic city, not its rulers. And finally, as we have already seen, the people in a democracy are not democratic characters.

Ferrari concludes Chapter 3 by considering the payoffs of looking at the city-soul analogy in this way. He thinks that mapping the moral character of a city onto the soul ‘invites us to see whole and at a stroke what we normally would not see whole and at a stroke’ (77). Conversely, mapping the soul onto the city allows us to see piecemeal what we normally see as a unity. In sum, ‘The correspondence recommends a joint awareness of political macrocosm and microcosm, of society and of self as organized wholes, at the
expense of one’s habitual focus on self in society, self in relation to others’ (79).

Moreover, Ferrari thinks that the analogy answers the brothers’ particular needs: by making the city and soul analogues and nothing more, Socrates’ defense of justice in the soul leaves out the external rewards of justice and so locates the value of justice in self-perfection. But by discussing the analogous city Socrates can also recommend a civic way of life and so discuss justice in its more conventional social sense. In addition, the analogy recommends a political stance that can reconnect the brothers to political rule by presenting an ideal – the philosopher-king – who rises above the external rewards associated with justice while still undertaking political rule.

In the final chapter, Ferrari argues that only in two cases do the soul-types rule their corresponding cities: the tyrant is the ruler of the tyrannical city, and the philosopher-king is the ruler of the just city. In neither case, however, is this due to the workings of the city-soul analogy, but rather to certain particularities and contingencies. The tyrant is the ruler of the tyrannical city because he has a natural propensity to reduce his city to an expression of his individual will so that he can maintain absolute power, and the philosopher-king rules the corresponding city because of the laws of the founders.

According to Ferrari, in writing the Republic this way, Plato intends to contrast his ethical position with one articulated by Isocrates, who held that an individual should become self-controlled so that his soul provides a model for the structure of the city and its citizens, which makes him fit to rule. Implicit in this view is that political rule is the greatest task a human can undertake – a point of view that Glaucon at least might find compelling. Socrates, by contrast, thinks that the individual who aims to rule (the tyrant) is miserable, while the one who is not interested in ruling (the philosopher-king) is happy.
For the philosopher-king, the highest good is philosophy, and thus he rules both the non-rational parts of his own soul and the city as a matter of necessity only.

Ferrari’s interpretation of the city-soul analogy, if successful, not only avoids the objections that Williams raises, but also suggests new ways of looking at certain central features of the Republic. I will now suggest, however, that we should hesitate to accept Ferrari’s interpretation of the analogy, since it is incompatible with two important sets of textual evidence.

I begin by quoting the two most difficult passages for Ferrari’s interpretation. Both state that the psychological and moral attributes of a city are due to the psychology of its citizens, and both are used to justify Socrates’ comparison of the soul to the city. The first occurs at 435e-436a, where Socrates justifies his first transition from a discussion of the city to a discussion of the soul. He says:

…we are surely compelled to agree that each of us has within himself the same parts and characteristics as the city? Where else would they come from? It would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness didn’t come to be in cities from such individuals as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us who are held to possess spirit, or that the same isn’t true of the love of learning, which is mostly associated with our part of the world, or the love of money, which one might say is conspicuously displayed by the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

This strongly implies that Socrates thinks that the character of a city is due to the character of its citizens.
The second passage is 544e, where Socrates justifies his transition from a discussion of degenerate cities to degenerate souls:

And do you realize that of necessity there are as many forms of human character as there are of constitutions? Or do you think that constitutions are born “from oak or rock” and not from the characters of the people who live in the cities governed by them, which tip the scales, so to speak, and drag the rest along with them?

Here Socrates explicitly states that the cause of the political constitution of a city is the psychological constitution of its corresponding citizen. Indeed Jonathan Lear, in his influential article, ‘Inside and Outside the Republic,’ seizes on these passages to defend a causal version of the dominant interpretation: the city and soul are analogous because, inter alia, just people rule just cities, timocratic people rule timocratic cities, and so on.

Ferrari notes these passages, but his primary reason for dismissing them is to point to all of the evidence that suggests that there is not a causal or constitutive relationship between cities and souls of the same types. But this does little to explain Plato’s purpose in making these claims that suggest otherwise. Ferrari argues that in each case Plato is giving a prima facie reason to expect characteristics at the level of the individual to reappear at the level of the city and vice versa, but that Plato goes on to deny this relationship (43, 50). But this attempt to explain away the conflicting textual evidence is unconvincing. Why would Plato explicitly justify his move from city to soul with certain claims but then put forward a picture that is at odds with those claims, without ever noting that the prima facie claim has turned out to be false? In the absence
of an explanation for this, there is significant pressure to find an interpretation of the city-soul analogy that accommodates the natural reading of these two important passages.

Ferrari’s account also fails to explain another feature of the text: Socrates refers to prominent citizens in each type of city by the same names he uses to refer to the soul types that are analogous to that city. In the case of timocracy, for example, Socrates refers to both the ruling citizens in a timocracy and the timocratic soul as ‘spirited’ (547, 550b), and as victory and honor-loving (548c, 549a, 550b). In the case of oligarchy, he refers to both the leading citizens in an oligarchy and the oligarchic soul as money-loving (551a, 553d). Moreover, we know from Republic ix that Socrates characterizes the parts of the soul in terms of their loves, so we know that a victory and honor-loving individual is dominated by the spirited part, and a money lover by the appetitive part (580d-581c). These passages suggest that the prominent citizens of a city type have the same broad psychological structure as the corresponding soul type.

Ferrari might respond by conceding that individuals who rule in a timocracy and timocratic individuals are both victory and honor-lovers, but that this is where the similarity ends, and likewise for money-lovers. And indeed Ferrari does say that ‘not every spirited person is a timocratic man’ (69); and, ‘not every money-lover has the character of the oligarchic man’ (71). Ferrari seems to think, then, that you can be an honor-lover without having a timocratic soul; and you can be a money-lover without having an oligarchic soul. But if this is Ferrari’s view, then it is incumbent on him to fill out this new taxonomy of Plato’s moral psychology. Is the idea that there are various species of an honor-loving or money-loving soul? If so, then we need an account of the
relevant differences, the psychological and ethical significance of these differences, and the explanation for why one honor-lover turns out one way, and another a different way.

We should hesitate, however, to accept the idea that two individuals both of whom love and are ruled by honor or money can have salient differences in psychological structure. Plato’s aim in the Republic is to show us the effect of what we value on our psychological health and happiness. He argues that only someone who is ruled by reason, either his own or that of another, can achieve psychological harmony, since only reason can determine how we should live such that each aspect of ourselves is fulfilled (442c). But if this is one upshot of Socrates’ claim that reason should rule, then he ought to think that there is some principled reason why loving and being ruled by honor, for example, will give you a certain kind of life, and similarly in the other cases. Do we really want to say with Ferrari that one honor-lover lives a complacent, carefree life, while another suffers from inner turmoil? And similarly for money-lovers? If it is possible to value honor or money or freedom and live a fulfilling enough life, then Plato has lost one intuitive reason he might give us to aspire to having a soul ruled by reason.

There are, then, significant obstacles to Ferrari’s interpretation of the city-soul analogy. The textual evidence he must overcome, however, does not diminish the textual evidence he has accumulated in favor of his view. And thus, just as Ferrari must contend with the evidence discussed here, anyone who wants to defend the dominant interpretation must respond to Ferrari’s evidence. A successful response to Ferrari’s evidence should, I think, proceed in two stages. First, a defender of the dominant interpretation must show that the differences that Ferrari cites between the psychological account of the rulers of cities and the corresponding souls are only surface differences.
Second, she must provide an explanation for the surface differences. One promising strategy could be to argue, along the lines mentioned above, that one of Plato’s aims in the *Republic* is to show us the effect of what we value on both our interaction with others and our interaction with the various parts of ourselves. When he discusses the individual in the city, Socrates is interested in the effect of what we value on our social interactions; when he discusses the individual soul he is interested in the effect of what we value on our interaction with ourselves. A defender of the dominant interpretation could then argue that this difference in emphasis explains the variation between Plato’s accounts of the individual in a city and the corresponding soul type. Given the richness of evidence that Ferrari has accumulated for his interpretation, however, this would indeed be a considerable project.

In sum, then, Ferrari provides a powerful challenge to the dominant interpretation of the city-soul analogy. In particular, his discussion of *Republic* viii draws attention to important differences between the ruling citizens of a city and their corresponding soul types that have not been sufficiently noted. Consequently, anyone interested in understanding this central feature of Plato’s *Republic* is well advised to come to terms with this slim but substantial book.

Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville